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INTRODUCTION TO EDUCATION SYMPOSIUM
MARK G. YUDOF*

Alexander Meiklejohn, who spent much of his professional life
studying the relationship between freedom of expression and democracy,' once described teaching as a task of "infinite difficulty." 2 The
task of the teacher is not only to teach the students about particular
subjects, but also, "under the authority of the social group," to initiate
students to the social group, to prepare them for citizenship and for
productive and satisfying careers.' Democracy and education, in his
mind, were vitally linked,4 and so they have been since the founding
of the nation.5
But encomiums to the importance of education do not resolve the
tough policy choices that must be made. As Meiklejohn put it, "what
should we teach? For whom do we teach? What is our goal, and what
is the source of its authority over us?" 6 In the last thirty years, since
the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education,7 these and other vital questions of educational policy have been
increasingly dominated by law and legal institutions.' Where previously there were a few legal constraints on public schools, and even
fewer legal entitlements for teachers and students, today we are witness to an era of federal statutes governing the treatment of the handicapped, 9 minorities,' 0 and women," constitutional decisions
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1. See A. MEIKLEJOHN,
(1948).

2. See

FREE SPEECH AND

ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT

ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN-TEACHER OF FREEDOM

161 (C.S. Brown ed. 1981).

3. See id. at 160-62.
4. See id. at 160-71.
5. See generally Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. BAR
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521.
6. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN-TEACHER OF FREEDOM

161 (C.S. Brown ed. 1981).
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. See generally M. YUDOF, D. KIRP, T. VAN GEEL & B. LEVIN, EDUCATIONAL POLICY

AND THE LAW

227, 413 (2d ed. 1982).

9. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1982). See gener-
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addressing complex issues of school finance 12 and desegregation, 13
state laws defining student and teacher rights,' 4 and myriad other enactments designed to shape the goals and operations of public
schooling.
The St. Mary's Law Journal is to be commended for recognizing
the link between law and public education and for assembling a group
of scholars who bring insight and wisdom to many of the critical issues facing the State of Texas and the nation. The symbolic importance of this innovative venture should not be lost on any reader.
This Symposium is published at a time of rekindled interest in elementary and secondary education, at a time of grave concern that our
public educational systems are failing, that our nation is at risk.' 5 The
Symposium also appears at a propitious moment in terms of the ebbs
and flows of educational policy. After many years of federal statutes
and federal court decisions, policy interventions tend more often to be
initiated at the state level.' 6 Most of the articles in this issue address
significant issues of state law, not federal law, and properly so. The
"action" is in the state legislatures, as William Bednar's fine discussion of House bill 72 demonstrates, 17 and in the interplay between
federal and state mandates.
As I perused the various contributions to the Symposium, I was
ally Yudof, Education for the Handicapped: Rowley in Perspective, 92 AM. J. EDUC. 163
(1984); Rothstein, Educational Rights of Severely and Profoundly Handicapped Children, 61
NEB. L. REV. 586 (1982); Note, Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate" Education: The
Educationfor All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1103 (1979).

10. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000c, d (1982). See generally Note, The

Courts, HEW, and Southern School Desegregation, 77 YALE L.J. 321 (1967).
11. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1982).
See generally M. YUDOF, D. KIRP, T. VAN GEEL & B. LEVIN, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND
THE LAW 746-92 (2d ed. 1982).
12. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40-44 (1973). See
generally J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970).

13. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 743-44 (1974). See generally M. YUDOF, D.
KIRP, T. VAN GEEL & B. LEVIN, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 413-563 (2d ed.
1982).
14. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 13.109 (termination of teachers on continuing contracts), 21.301 (suspension of students)(Vernon Supp. 1985). See generally Armstrong & HolIan, infra p. 783; Bednar, infra p. 813.
15. See National Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation at Risk (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Department of Education, 1983); E. BOYLE, HIGH SCHOOL 1-8 (1983).
16. See generally M. YUDOF, D. KIRP, T. VAN GEEL & B. LEVIN, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 332-411 (2d ed. 1982).
17. See Bednar, infra p. 813.
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struck by the common threads that run through them. One such
theme is the increasing legalization of the educational process' 8 and
the need for accommodation between the rule of law and the informality of discretion in the learning process. For example, Professor
Gerald Reamey analyzes the competing concerns for flexibility in preserving the safety of the public schools against the formal claims of
students who wish to be treated with respect for their individuality
and privacy.19 Mr. Bednar implicitly questions the ability of any lawmaking body to specify with precision the characteristics of the outstanding teacher.2" There must be rules and benchmarks, but the brilliant teacher is not easily classified. So too, there must be general
rules that govern interscholastic competitions, otherwise there would
be chaos and unfairness.2 ' But those rules must also be tempered by
individual justice, protecting the student caught in a web of regulations that were not designed for his or her circumstances.
In a similar vein, Mr. Bednar reminds us that the delineation of
authority over education between the federal government and the
states does not exhaust the relevant universe of questions about the
allocation of governing authority. The achievements of the American
educational system rest in part on the decentralization of authority to
local school districts. We have been blessed by the absence of a national ministry of education, free to impose uniformity and to inculcate students to a common political orientation.2 2 A balkanized
governing structure in education has been a bulwark against tyranny.
In addition, local school districts have had the freedom to tailor their
programs to the needs of their children and to the preferences of their
parents. Abuses, of course, have occurred, but any reexamination of
educational policies should be sensitive to the conflicting currents of
state-mandated excellence and local discretion to fashion programs in
the light of special circumstances.
The authors of the Symposium articles also remind us that it is a
18. See generally Kirp, Proceduralism and Bureaucracy. Due Process in the School Setting, 28 STAN. L. REV. 841, 870-76 (1976) ("Reconsidering the Allure of the Due Process
Hearing"); Yudof, Legalization of Dispute Resolution, Distrust ofAuthority, and Organizational
Theory: Implementing Due Processfor Students in the PublicSchools, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 891,
894-98.
19. See Reamey, infra p. 933.
20. See Bednar, infra p. 813.
21. See Comment, infra p. 979.
22. See generally M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND
GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA

114-16 (1983).
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mistake to view public schools in instrumental terms only. Schools
are large-scale institutions inhabited by living and breathing human
beings-students, teachers, and administrators-who spend years of
their lives in classrooms, hallways, and offices. The quality of their
lives is not unimportant, though it sometimes must be balanced
against the educational mission of the larger enterprise. While we
wish to rid the schools of incompetent teachers and to rehabilitate
23
miscreant students, we are also committed to norms of fairness.
Many teachers may be dedicated public servants, but they are also
employees concerned about arbitrary dismissal, working conditions,
and compensation. They seek job security and higher pay, just like
the rest of us, and inevitably some of their aspirations conflict with
the realities of educational programs and budgets. William Armstrong and Rosemary Hollan ably describe the complexities in devising legal rules that protect teachers as employees while leaving school
districts free to pursue their essential educational objectives.24
The question of student rights is similarly fraught with difficulties.
The idea of free speech for students is a relatively recent development, 25 and, at some level, the core concept of individual rights of
expression is inconsistent with the schooling enterprise. Under the
compulsory attendance laws, students are required to be in school,
and they are there for the purpose of learning. The polity, through its
elected and appointed officers, has set the agenda. If students may
rearrange the curriculum, if they all have a right to speak at the same
time, or if they may comment on the American League pennant race
in the geometry class, then there can be no learning. Education and
socialization involve a process of editing or selection; decisions must
be made as to what is to be taught and how; and those decisions are
not generally entrusted to the young.
Yet, despite the necessities of any educational process, we justifiably recoil from the notion that students have none of the speech rights
of citizens; for students, hopefully, will mature into autonomous citizens and the school community itself should at least resemble the
larger democratic community. It is difficult to teach democratic
norms in undemocratic institutions. Thus, as Messieurs Mawdsley
23. See Armstrong & Hollan, infra p. 783; Reamey, infra 933.
24. See Armstrong & Hollan, infra p. 783.
25. See D. KIRP & M. YUDOF, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 137-38 (lst ed.
1974).
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and Permuth explain, free speech rights are modified to take account
of the age of the speakers and the demands of educational institutions. 6 The courts attempt to protect student expression while preserving the educational environment from disruption and diversion.2 7
Thus, our courts must honor the authority of adult educators while
affording some recognition to the bundles of rights of citizenship possessed by the young.
There are other important themes that emerge from the Symposium issue. One of these, aptly analyzed by Kelly Frels and Jeffrey
Horner, is that school officials are frequently held to a good faith standard in the discharge of their responsibilities.2 8 It is as if the courts
are demanding conscientious teachers and administrators, requiring
them to act with cognizance of their constitutional and other legal
obligations.2 9 School officials may not be held liable for damages for
constitutional torts unless they have acted in bad faith, ignoring clear
constitutional commands.3 0 They may remove books from the school
library for sound educational reasons, but not out of a political animus to particular ideas. 3 The teacher's right to academic freedom
may be circumscribed by reasonable educational judgments, but not
32
by a bad faith effort to suppress objectionable ideas and information.
A teacher may be dismissed for incompetence, but not for protected
first amendment activities. 3 In each case, why school officials act is
as important as how they act. The clear message is that courts have
no monopoly on the interpretation of state and federal mandates.34
Educators must learn to police themselves; they have a responsibility
to know the law, to consult their legal advisors, and to abide by legal
norms in good faith.
Finally, Ellen-Smith Pryor raises the most profound questions
about our educational system in her examination of student compe-

26. See Mawdsley & Permuth, infra p. 873.
27. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506-07
(1969).
28. See Frels & Homer, infra p. 851.
29. Cf Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27
STAN. L. REV. 585, 601 (1975)..
30. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975).
31. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 872-74 (1982).
32. See Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 544 (10th Cir. 1979).
33. See Armstrong & Hollan, infra p. 783.
34. See Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to ConstitutionalInterpretation, 27
STAN. L. REV. 585, 587-89 (1975).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

5

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 16 [2022], No. 4, Art. 2

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:777

tency testing in Texas. How do we measure excellence? What is the
relationship between academic excellence and achievement after graduation? Should the goal of education be equal outcomes or a fair process, and what is the relationship between the two? Is there a tradeoff between educational excellence and educational equity? What
should we do about the unfortunate link between race and socioeconomic status and educational achievement? And even if we can reach
some policy consensus on some of these exasperating issues, what
role, if any, should the law play? That we should work to instill basic
skills in all of our children commands wide support. How we should
do it-for example, whether high school diplomas ought to be denied
to underachieving students-commands only disagreement.
As the immortal Yogi Berra once said, "You've got to be very careful if you don't know where you are going, because you might not get
there." 36 The contributors to this Symposium have not resolved the
myriad dilemmas of the relationship between law and educational policy. They have not spun out neat theories linking legal interventions
with some idealized vision of public schooling. But they have illumined our path, bringing into view the obstacles that must be overcome. They have asked insightful questions even as they have
avoided the simple answers. In a modest way, they are telling us
where we have been and where we might go. Wherever the "there" is
for public schooling, they have moved us in the right direction.

35. See Pryor, infra p. 903.
36. K. NELSON, BASEBALL'S GREATEST QUOTES 160 (1982).
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